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1. Introduction   
This Policy Brief is based on the case study conducted within Work Package 1 of the INEX 
project on the development of the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), as set out in the 
working document, The Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System II: The Legacy of 
“Laboratories” and the Cost for Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law.
1 This paper 
synthesises the key findings from the case study and puts forward a set of policy 
recommendations for improving policy strategies in the development of large-scale IT 
systems in the EU’s Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
The Schengen Information System II was selected as the subject of analysis for several key 
reasons: first, the SIS occupies a central role within the EU’s AFSJ; it is a key measure 
underpinning the freedom of movement and forms a cornerstone of the EU’s internal security 
and migration management strategies. Second, the decision to upgrade the Schengen 
Information System to accommodate new member states and new functionalities is a tangible 
example of the growing priority given to security technologies within the EU’s internal 
security strategy. Given that SIS II is only one of several new, large-scale EU databases 
currently in the pipeline, it is pertinent to examine decision-making on SIS II in order to draw 
wider lessons for the EU’s information management strategy. Finally, the development of SIS 
II was selected for analysis because it has become synonymous with inefficient policy-
making: the project is considerably over budget, several years behind schedule and the source 
of serious tensions between member states and the Commission. At the time of writing, more 
than five years after the original deadline for completion of the SIS II project, the second 
generation of the SIS is still not operational and there is no guarantee that SIS II will come 
on-stream in the near future, if at all. More worrying still, should SIS II enter into operation, 
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serious question marks hang over its impact on fundamental rights in view of the new 
functionalities (including storage of biometric data) and extended scope of the upgraded 
system. 
The case study aimed at determining the underlying causes for the deficiencies of SIS II, by 
focusing on the legal and political governance frameworks and decision-making practices 
during both the design and development phases of the SIS II project. It charted the 
chronological development of SIS II over the period 2001–11 and assessed the implications 
of the patterns of governance and decision-making for the principles of accountability, 
proportionality and fundamental rights. This Policy Brief first synthesises the key findings 
that emerged from the case study. It then elaborates a number of policy recommendations. 
2.  Key findings: Decision-making on SIS II and implications for the 
rule of law 
2.1  SIS II shaped by the politics of emergency  
Emergency-driven agendas played a considerable role in driving forward the negotiations on 
SIS II, which took place largely within Council working groups under the former EU third 
pillar. Decisions on the scope of SIS II were shaped by a security-oriented logic based on the 
construction of new transnational ‘threats’ to the EU, which were strengthened following the 
acts of political violence in New York in 2001 and Madrid in 2004. The politics of emergency 
surrounding 9/11 provided impetus for, and justified, a policy process on SIS II for which 
there was no clear legal competence. It allowed member states to propose and quickly agree 
on a number of functionalities for SIS II that, given their implications for fundamental rights 
and rule of law, would have otherwise provided points of profound controversy.  
In addition, political pressures to have SIS II on-stream in time to allow for the expansion of 
Schengen to the ten countries that joined the EU in the enlargement of 2004 led to an over-
ambitious timetable. This had the effect of sidelining proper procedures for evidence-based 
policy-making (such as impact assessments) and excluded opportunities for democratic 
debate. Pressures surrounding the unrealistic calendar for SIS II meant that the European 
Commission began developing the technical system without first having the appropriate 
legislative instruments and legal basis in place, thus sowing the seeds for the technical, 
political and ethical tensions that followed.  
2.2 Fragmented  decision-making and struggles between the 
Community and intergovernmental methods of cooperation 
The difficulties encountered by SIS II cannot be separated from the fragmented decision-
making and struggles between the Community and intergovernmental methods of cooperation 
that have marked the project from the outset. Despite endowing the European Commission 3 
with project management powers in 2001, and even after the expansion of the co-decision 
procedure in 2005, which strengthened the legislative roles of the Commission and 
Parliament, member states have not been ready to relinquish control of a tool so central to 
security and migration management. Strategies to retain ownership of the project have 
emerged. These include the proliferation, since 2006, of a complex network of expert working 
groups that have served as a means for national delegations and experts to steer the direction 
of the SIS II project in accordance with their aims. The proposal for an ‘intergovernmental’ 
alternative to SIS II (named SIS I+RE) put forward by Austria, France and Germany in 2008 
can be interpreted as another strategy by member states to retain control of the Schengen 
Information System and it represents a direct political challenge to the European 
Commission.  
Repeated interventions from the Council and the member states have not only contributed to 
complicating the development process of what was already a highly complex technical 
project, but have also undermined the project management capabilities of the Commission 
and called into question the Commission’s perceived capability to develop large-scale IT 
systems. Consequently, the responsibility for developing the large-scale IT system (currently 
an exclusive Commission competence) may in future be transferred to the proposed IT 
agency, which is to be responsible for the operational management of large-scale IT systems. 
This move could be interpreted as a step backward in Europeanisation (and a return to the 
intergovernmental origins of Schengen), given that the agency’s management board would be 
comprised primarily of member states. 
2.3  Weak rule of law, transparency and democratic accountability 
Eliciting parallels with decision-making under the Schengen regime, an absence of rule of 
law, transparency and democratic accountability has characterised the design and 
development of SIS II. Several years before formal legislative proposals were presented by 
the Commission in 2006, new features and functionalities for the SIS II were being discussed 
and agreed by national experts (police, interior ministry representatives and experts of 
security technologies) in closed-door Council working groups within the former third-pillar 
framework. The adoption of the Regulation and Decision on SIS II in 2006 provided the first 
opportunity for democratic debate, particularly as the legislative package on SIS II was 
subject to the co-decision procedure. By this time, however, the technical specifications for 
the new system had already been agreed in a series of non-binding Council and Commission 
documents and work on the development of the system was underway by external contractors. 
This limited the possibilities for democratic debate on the added value, necessity, scope and 
features of the SIS II.  4 
The ability of the European Parliament to play its full role as co-legislator was further 
constrained. The political urgency surrounding the adoption of the SIS II Regulation and 
Decision was used to speed up the adoption of the SIS II legislative package by the European 
Parliament, through the use of an informal trialogue procedure that further limited the 
possibility for democratic debate and scrutiny of the legislative proposals.  
Since the adoption of the legal basis in 2006, a lack of transparency and accountability 
continues to characterise decision-making procedures surrounding the technical and political 
development of SIS II. The network of committees, groups, boards and task forces working 
on SIS II, some without a formal mandate and several with restricted participation, enable a 
small group of national experts to play a strong role in steering the direction of the project to 
the extent that who is really deciding on the direction of SIS II is obscured.  
2.4  Marginalisation of proportionality and fundamental rights 
considerations 
Against the background of this emergency-led, fragmented and expert-driven decision-
making, questions regarding proportionality and fundamental ethical concerns have been 
marginalised. In violation of the EU’s proportionality rule for policy-making, no assessment 
has been made of the necessity, added value and effects of the new system.  
The fundamental rights implications of SIS II did not feature during the decision-making 
process, and were only introduced with the involvement of the European Parliament in 2006, 
although as seen above, the ability of the Parliament to play its full role as co-legislator was 
constrained. Consequently, and despite the Parliament’s crucial input, SIS II will only 
partially overcome the serious deficiencies in fundamental rights of the current Schengen 
Information System. Meanwhile, the new functionalities of SIS II, such as biometrics, the 
interlinkage of alerts and the possibility for the system to be interoperable with other large-
scale EU databases, poses a series of important new ethical questions that have yet to be fully 
answered by the EU. 
3.  Policy recommendations  
In view of the research findings synthesized in this Policy Brief, the following policy 
recommendations are put forward: 
•  SIS II has been shaped by the politics of emergency. Henceforward, steps should be 
taken to ensure that an evidence-based approach prevails over incident-driven 
policy-making. This implies a genuine assessment of whether new tools for 
information exchange will increase internal security in the EU, based on full 
consideration of the principles of necessity, efficiency, proportionality and fundamental 5 
rights. Advancing the EU strategy on information management should begin with an 
independent inventory of current policies, tools and institutional structures involved in 
data exchange in the field of security at the EU level, building on the Commission’s 
preliminary mapping exercise undertaken in 2010.
2 Such an inventory could feed into 
the forthcoming European Commission Communication on the European Information 
Exchange Model that is scheduled for 2012, which should be used as an opportunity for 
a genuine reassessment of the value and appropriateness of current instruments, and not 
an opportunity to propose new and unnecessary measures.
3  
•  SIS II has not yet proved to be proportionate, safe and reliable. No new database 
should be set up until SIS II is found to have met these criteria. Both the Directorate-
General (DG) for Justice, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights of the European 
Commission and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) should be engaged to conduct 
a fundamental rights proof-reading of SIS II, taking into account the risks implied by 
its potential interoperability with other large-scale databases. This assessment should 
include a comparison of the impact of the current SIS on fundamental rights and the 
extent to which SIS II will replicate/overcome these deficiencies. Should SIS II fail its 
second milestone test, neither SIS 1+RE nor any other alternative to SIS II should be 
developed until a thorough assessment has been made of the ethical, efficacy and 
financial implications and a clear allocation of responsibility for the development of the 
alternative system has been defined in advance. If the decision is taken to delegate to 
member states the development of an alternative scenario for a transitional period, how 
the financial and legal accountability of the member states will be ensured in this 
regard must be specified. 
•  An unrealistic timetable exerted artificial pressures on the decision-making process on 
SIS II. Over-ambitious political timetables  should be avoided, particularly in 
matters concerning the AFSJ and in areas as sensitive as security policy. They can 
weaken budgetary oversight, allowing financial expenditures to escalate. Moreover, by 
sidelining proper democratic and judicial scrutiny of new security technology 
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measures, they risk undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law, and lead to 
more insecurity for the individual.
4  
•  Decisions on SIS II have largely been taken behind closed doors, in expert working 
groups and (until recently) with limited involvement of the European Parliament. The 
democratic accountability of policy-making relating to the development of large-scale 
EU databases must be ensured by allowing the European Parliament to play its full 
role in the policy process. Parliament should be fully informed of discussions and 
developments and given sufficient time to scrutinise proposals for future, large-scale 
EU IT systems. Informal trialogue procedures should not be used to fast-track 
legislative proposals. Where trialogue procedures undermine transparency and remove 
the opportunity for open and plural debate, they are counterproductive. Likewise, the 
Parliament does not need to rely on the speed by which it passes legislation to prove 
itself a responsible co-legislator (despite pressures to the contrary). Efficiency is 
measured not through speed but the extent to which the Parliament exercises 
democratic scrutiny of the legislative process, in fulfilment of its role as guardian of 
liberties and democracy in the EU. It is worth recalling that in the case of SIS II, it was 
the European Parliament that brought forward questions of fundamental rights and 
budgetary oversight. Given the central role of the Parliament in holding policy-makers 
accountable to citizens (and taxpayers), the LIBE committee could take steps to 
strengthen its scrutiny of large-scale IT systems. This may require upgrading the 
current informal Privacy Platform into a formal working group or establishing a new 
working group looking more specifically at issues related to the EU’s information 
management strategy, including but not limited to privacy aspects. This working group 
would contribute to discussions surrounding the European Information Exchange 
Model and the desirable way forward for large-scale EU IT systems by considering the 
real necessity of these instruments for internal security, as well as their impact on 
fundamental rights and budgets.  
•  Expertise has been privileged in decision-making on SIS II, to the exclusion of other 
voices. In developing future, large-scale IT systems, the role of experts should be re-
assessed and counter-balanced by allowing a plurality of actors and perspectives to 
provide input to the policy process. A close and formalised partnership should be 
ensured with the FRA, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party in the phases preceding the formal adoption of 
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proposals and when monitoring their implementation to assess the ethical impacts, 
added value and practical effectiveness of large-scale EU IT systems. This should be 
complemented by open consultation mechanisms with other key stakeholders, such as 
practitioners and civil society organisations. 
•  The SIS II experience has led directly to the decision to create an agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the AFSJ. Appropriate 
safeguards must be included in the legislation establishing the agency in order to avoid 
the risk of function creep and prevent infringements of the principle of purpose 
limitation. The legislation must be clear about the competences and plainly define and 
limit the scope of activities of the agency. The agency should operate in a transparent 
manner subject to democratic oversight by the European Parliament. The Parliament 
should therefore participate in the selection procedure for the agency’s executive 
director and receive regular reports from the agency’s management board.  
•  The ethical dimension has not been part of the policy process of SIS II. Respect for 
fundamental rights and data protection must move to the centre of future policy 
strategies for developing large-scale IT systems in the AFSJ. The impact of new 
databases or any evolution in the use of current security technology on the individual 
should be carefully and independently assessed, and properly considered by the 
relevant Commission services before any new initiative is presented. This should be 
complemented by the application by DG for Justice, Citizenship and Fundamental 
Rights of the Commission’s new methodology for evaluating EU policy compliance 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
5 Furthermore, ‘data protection by design’, 
allowing for automated solutions to data protection requirements (such as automatic 
deletion of data at the end of the permitted period), should be made an obligatory 
feature in the implementation of new and existing databases. Individuals must be 
adequately protected against the consequences of data inaccuracies or of negligent data 
exchange and must be properly informed of their rights.
6 
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